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ABSTRACT: I defend the containment view—the position that a fetus is (1) merely contained by its mother and (2) an organism during pregnancy. I argue against the parthood view, which states that a fetus is part of its mother. To do so, I bring the personal identity literature—particularly animalism—to bear on the metaphysics of pregnancy literature. I propose that an adequate account of pregnancy must tell a coherent story about what happens at birth. I deploy three thought experiments, each modeled on classic transplant, fission, and remnant cases to demonstrate that the parthood view must make unappealing commitments to explain birth. Specifically, it is incompatible with standard accounts of human animal persistence. By contrast, the containment view offers a simple explanation.
Under review | Email me for a draft
ABSTRACT: What is wrong with violence? This paper explores an under-recognized aspect of violence: its moral significance for parents. For many parents, raising children is part of what gives meaning, structure, and shape to their lives and senses of self—it is a reproductive project. I offer a substantive account of projects which explains their role in our moral lives; and I argue that we have an obligation not to undermine the permissible projects of others without good reasons. Violence harms children and thereby undermines the reproductive projects which they are central to. Thus, violence fails our obligation and is a pro tanto wrong in part for this reason. This is particularly salient to mothers who, taking a global and historical perspective, perform the vast majority of reproductive work. Taken seriously, this account has potentially revisionary implications for criminal sanction and the waging of war.
In preparation
ABSTRACT: Is carrying out a pregnancy (ever) morally praiseworthy? Remarkably, partisans on both far sides of the abortion debate agree that the answer is No. For conservatives, carrying out a pregnancy is the moral minimum which does not deserve praise. It is merely not killing. For liberals, carrying out a pregnancy is a morally neutral lifestyle choice which only involves one member of the moral community—the mother. Despite deep disagreements, the result is the same: There is nothing morally special about carrying out a pregnancy. I argue against this dominant position that carrying out a pregnancy is typically morally praiseworthy. I diagnose the consensus between conservatives and liberals on abortion as stemming from the shared aims of making the ethics of abortion appear simple and the political issue as winnable as possible. I argue that these aims come at the cost of recognizing the moral value of pregnancy. Why does this matter? The United States offers notoriously poor support for pregnant women and mothers. I ask whether these rampant policy failures are in part explained by our attitudes toward the moral value of pregnancy—attitudes which are in turn partially explained by the dominance of abortion politics.